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Abstract 
How does technology influence international negotiations? This article explores ‘track-change 
diplomacy’ – how diplomats use information and communication technology (ICT) such as 
word processing software and mobile devices to collaboratively edit and negotiate documents. 
To analyze the widespread but understudied phenomenon of track-change diplomacy, the article 
adopts a practice-oriented approach to technology, developing the concept of affordance: the 
way a tool or technology simultaneously enables and constrains the tasks users can possibly 
perform with it. The article shows how digital ICT affords shareability, visualization and 
immediacy of information, thus shaping the temporality and power dynamics of international 
negotiations. These three affordances have significant consequences for how states construct 
and promote national interests; how diplomats reach compromises among a large number of 
states (as text edits in collective drafting exercises); and how power plays out in international 
negotiations. Drawing on ethnographic methods, including participant observation of 
negotiations between the EU’s member states as well as in-depth interviews, the analysis casts 
new light on these negotiations, where documents become the site of both semantic and 
political struggle. Rather than delivering on the technology’s promise of keeping track and 
reinforcing national oversight in negotiations, we argue that track-change diplomacy can in fact 
lead to a loss of control, challenging existing understandings of diplomacy. 
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Introduction 
We appreciate the hard work you have done on this file. We are ready to lift our 
reservations on the text. As regards the outstanding issue, I have a very strange 
instruction [laughter around the table], but the compromise just proposed by 
Tom can be a way forward (Ambassador at Coreper 1, 18.02.2015; Nielsen 
2015).  
This is how a national ambassador explains his country’s position in the European Union 
(EU). What is said may initially appear trivial (the laughter occurred because everyone around 
the table recognized that the ambassador felt a need to signal a subtle difference between the 
outcome and the instructions he had received from their capital), but it demonstrates how 
diplomats promote national interests during international negotiations. The ambassador in the 
quote above refers to his colleagues’ preparations prior to the meeting in terms of editing the 
document – a Word file – which has led to a draft text they are willing to accept. It serves as the 
perfect example of contemporary multilateral negotiations. These days, multiple authors, based 
in multiple locations find compromises using collaborative text drafting software, email and 
mobile devices. The track-change function in word processing software should, in principle, 
make text changes and revisions more visible during negotiations than would otherwise be the 
case. Yet, in actuality, the opposite happens. As we shall see, when hundreds of people 
negotiate on a document at high speed, track-changes can be an instrument of (at times 
intentional) opacity, rather than transparency, and diplomats can lose control. How can we 
explain this phenomenon?  
In this article, we provide an explanation and add to international relations theory by 
unpacking how the concept of affordances links practices and technology. We focus on 
diplomacy where the effects of technology have received little attention (but see Bátora 2008; 
Bjola and Holmes eds. 2015; Branch 2017; Cooper et al. 2013; Duncombe 2017; Hocking and 
Melissen 2015). Innovations in communication technology from the telegraph to the email have 
not just accelerated international negotiations; each technological innovation has helped 
determine what kind of diplomacy can take place. Today, international negotiations are largely 
a digitally-mediated struggle for semantic control over documents. Yet our theories of 
international relations have so far largely failed to take the changes in international negotiations 
due to technology into account. One reason is that our understandings of negotiations still 
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revolve around the notion of diplomats acting as mediators (Constantinou 2013; Sharp 2009; 
Der Derian 1987), whereas ICT has removed many barriers of space and time. Another reason 
is that it is difficult to gain access to the negotiation table unless you are one of the negotiating 
parties. For this reason, scholars discover certain phenomena only incidentally.  
 That is exactly what happened to us in the rounds of participant observation we conducted 
in the diplomatic engine room of the EU, the Council of Ministers. Diplomatic use of email, 
mobile devices, and word processing software features – e.g. track-changes, tables, or bold text 
– may seem inconsequential. However, it significantly impacts national positions and the sorts 
of international compromises that states can reach. It is in the documents’ changes, rejections 
and acceptances, that negotiators enact the politics of international relations. For this reason, 
“track-change diplomacy” deserves the undivided attention of international relations scholars. 
By coining the term track-change diplomacy we do not claim to have discovered a radically 
new process unique to the digital age. Diplomacy has, for a long time, involved collective text 
drafting (although we have never known much about the process itself). However, as this article 
will demonstrate, ICT changes international negotiations in significant ways.  
 We use the term track-change diplomacy as a heuristic to analyze how ICT (including, but 
not limited to the track-change function in word processing software) shapes diplomatic 
negotiations. We will focus on three main affordances of this technology: shareability, 
Visualization and immediacy. Affordances are the inherent action potentials of a given 
technology, which its users do not always realize. We argue that the specific technology used to 
reach diplomatic compromises fundamentally informs how drafting and negotiating proceed. 
Shareability allows for multiple co-authors to work on a document, while visualization means 
these authors operate within a particular schematized design aesthetic, and the immediacy of 
high-speed text circulation facilitates back-and-forth editing under continuous time pressure. In 
large multilateral settings that negotiate on a continuous basis, these three characteristics 
collectively shape key international relations categories: negotiators define the national interest 
as textual edits, they reach compromises through aesthetically circumscribed drafting exercises, 
and power is emergent as the individual negotiator experiences a loss of agency when the text 
gains a life of its own. In some instances, when diplomats deal with non-vital national interests, 
the characteristics of track-change diplomacy can result in diplomats losing control over the 
negotiation process and even adopting legislation that none of the negotiating parties intended.  
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 We have divided this article into five parts. The first section unfolds how scholars have 
analyzed international negotiations and the production of texts in diplomacy to date – focusing 
on cables, reports and speeches – rather than internationally negotiated texts. The second 
section outlines how international relations scholarship has drawn on Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) and Actor Network Theory (ANT), but still lacks a language to properly unpack 
how diplomats use technology in practice. The third section develops the concept of 
technological affordance as something that both enables and constrains the tasks that users can 
possibly perform. The fourth section presents our ethnography, integrating participant 
observation, confidential documents and interviews. In the final section, we demonstrate the 
value of our affordance approach to technology through an in-depth analysis of everyday 
negotiations in the EU. We conclude by outlining a research agenda on technology-in-practice, 
enabling international relations theory to better address how technologies from artificial 
intelligence to social media affect international relations. 
 
Diplomacy and the drafting of documents in international negotiations 
 The very nature of track-change diplomacy explains why states can lose oversight, and how 
the process of negotiation tends to gain a life of its own. The Lisbon Treaty (2009) is a case in 
point. This treaty, which revised the institutional setting of the EU, includes several provisions 
that none of the member states cared for. For example, the Treaty’s infamous article 50, the so-
called ‘divorce clause’ that the British government activated to begin Brexit, the UK’s exit from 
the EU, has a complex negotiation history, which its authors do not fully recollect, nor agree 
upon. According to Lord Kerr, former chief British diplomat, the article was not directed at 
democratic member states, but would be triggered in the case of a dictatorship (de Wit 2016). 
Other members of the Convention on the Future of Europe, including former Member of the 
European Parliament, Andrew Duff, remember that the motivation behind article 50 was purely 
symbolic, and that the article was never meant to be used at all (Duff 2016). Such puzzling 
situations, where states agree upon negotiation outcomes that they did not really intend, calls 
for an inside view into the diplomatic engine room.  
The study of international negotiations presents numerous challenges. Even a relatively 
open multilateral body, such as the EU, is secretive when it comes to the performance and 
defense of national interests. Consequently, scholars and journalists rely on the outcome of 
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meetings in the form of official end documents, formal negotiation rules and distribution of 
votes, or draw on interviews with negotiators. These sorts of ‘outsiders’ have difficulties asking 
questions about phenomena they do not know the existence of, or which they may consider 
irrelevant from the outset, while diplomats might not be fully aware of all the elements that 
shape their negotiations. Only a few scholars have had the opportunity to actually observe 
confidential multilateral negotiations. To the limited extent that international relations, 
diplomatic and practice-oriented scholars have analyzed text production in diplomacy, they 
have primarily focused on communication within a national foreign service – cables, notes, 
strategy papers – or public texts. Drawing on participant observation in the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Iver B. Neumann has argued that diplomatic documents such as speeches 
are about the production of texts that “the entire ministry may stand behind” (2012, 81; see also 
Neumann 2007) rather than attempts to produce or communicate new policies (see also Cornut 
2015).  
Despite the valuable insights yielded by international relations theory and specifically 
practice-oriented scholarship on diplomatic text production such as the importance of “pen-
holding” in the UN Security Council (Ross 2007; Farrall and Prantl 2016; Pouliot 2016a) or 
“audit culture” (Kuus 2016), it has, so far, failed to consider the tools used when producing text, 
or the way in which technology contributes to representing national interests. Practice-oriented 
scholars have analysed text drafting as reflecting social dynamics in the negotiation, such as a 
“struggle over competence” (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014) or “collective consciousness” 
(Ralph and Gifkins 2017), but have not addressed how text drafting co-constitutes social 
dynamics. They have shown that diplomats conceive and handle multilateral agreements – 
whether declarations or international law – from the very beginning as documents with shared 
authorship.1 As Vincent Pouliot puts it, “[the] skillful practice of multilateral negotiation is – 
literally – a collective accomplishment” (2016a, 16). Yet, this collective accomplishment, as we 
will show, is not just due to socialization among permanent representatives, the use of particular 
software and technology also makes compromises possible. Even critical scholars, while 
attending closely to “narratives of production” – for example the drafting of UN resolutions 
(Shepherd 2008) – say little about the work of construction itself. Izadora Do Monte mentions 
                                                 
1 Pouliot (2011) and Adler-Nissen (2014) describe how national diplomats rather than defending national interests 
in terms of substantive ‘win-sets’ (Putnam 1988), translate opposing demands between their home and the 
multilateral UN context they negotiate in. 
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in passing that UN Security Council discussions are “organized through electronic mail and 
ruled by informal but well-established conventions. The outcome of these discussions, either 
simply resolved by email exchanges or after a real live discussion, is a resolution” (2016, 674). 
In sum, while international relations scholars generally acknowledge that “diplomacy has been 
influenced by the development of available means of communication and transportation” 
(Jönsson and Hall 2005, 90) they yet have to integrate this observation when studying 
diplomacy.  
Beyond international relations theory, there is a large body of literature on the production of 
documents and their role within organizations and bureaucracies (for an overview, see Freeman 
and Maybin 2011). But researchers have rarely established connection between these studies 
and diplomatic scholarship (for an exception, see Dittmer 2016). Within anthropology and 
sociology, scholars such as Latour (2005) and Hull (2012) highlight how everyday practices in 
producing documents – and the material qualities of the text themselves – have tangible social 
effects. The invention of the printing press was critical to the emergence of modern science, just 
as particular material properties of documents have enabled governments to act over time and 
space (Latour 1986). Sociologist Richard Harper (1998) has demonstrated by tracing 
“document careers” in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it is possible to discern how an 
organization is structured. Indeed, by studying the circulation and materiality of documents 
such as paper quality, stamps, and letterheads, as well as the aesthetics of textual features – 
“paragraphs, tables, subtitles, fonts, margins, and bullets” (Hull 2012, 255) – we can uncover 
how bureaucracies function. 
Annelise Riles (1998; 1999) comes closest to capturing the nature of international 
negotiations of text in her fascinating participant observations of the UN. As she shows, 
delegations place their suggestions to a given text in brackets. The aesthetics of creating a 
bracket-free ‘clean’ text, rather than having the text convey a particular meaning, becomes the 
primary logic that shapes the negotiation process. Negotiators dismiss some versions of 
bracketed text, while they consolidate others. Riles’ anthropology offers crucial insight into 
everyday diplomatic document drafting, including what scholars often overlook, but which is 
omnipresent in multilateral negotiation: aesthetics. However, we still lack knowledge about 
how diplomats use ICT during negotiations, how it shapes expectations and the implications for 
international relations categories such as national interests, compromises and power. Our 
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analysis points towards not only the dynamics of face-to-face meetings (Holmes 2013), but also 
the affordances of technology that help shape these negotiations. 
 
Technology and practice in international relations theory 
In international relations theory, focusing on idealizations of technology, rather than on 
technology in practice, can easily distort our understanding of technology. In recent years, 
however, concepts from Science and Technology Studies (STS) and the sub-field of Actor-
Network-Theory (ANT) have gained popularity among international relations scholars in a bid 
to bring technology deeper into our understanding of world politics. As an interdisciplinary 
research field, STS is interested in the social constitution of science and technology, and, in 
turn, how science and technology have constitutive effects on society (Jacobsen 2015).  
 International relations scholars drawing on STS and ANT aim to show how technologies 
facilitate different modes of international politics. In a study of the materials of diplomatic 
practice, Pouliot observes that technology (such as nuclear warheads) may even make people 
“do things they would not have done otherwise” (2010, 294). Despite this understanding, we 
still lack a precise explanation of what precipitates this action. Concepts such as assemblage, 
actant and inscription are particularly relevant for our research aim, but, as we will argue in this 
section, a theoretical language to unpack how users enact technology in practice is still 
underdeveloped.   
 The concept of assemblage is based on the idea that humans, animals and things 
dynamically relate to each other in heterogeneous groups, from which productive outcomes 
emerge beyond the individual (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).2 Conceptually speaking, this means 
that international organizations, diplomats or foreign ministries are not taken-for-granted 
entities, but rather traceable physical and cognitive processes, events, buildings, borders, 
humans and networks (Dittmer 2016; McConnell and Dittmer 2018; Hoijtink 2017; Lisle 2018). 
ANT focuses on such assemblages (i.e. Actor Networks). Its founders, Michel Callon, John 
Law and Bruno Latour, developed the concept of actant – a term which asserts the “quasi-
agential properties of matter” (Mitchell 2014, 12; Coole 2013; Cudworth and Hobden 2013). 
                                                 
2 In his pioneering work on cyberspace, Ronald Deibert was among the first to argue that the “material properties” 
(Deibert 2003, 504) and “‘biases’ of communication technologies […] shape and constrain the environment within 
which communications take place” (Deibert 2003, 503). 
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Actants may be algorithms (Aradau and Blanke 2017; Amoore and Raley 2017), drones 
(Leander 2013; Schandorf and Karatzogianni 2018), flags (Bueger 2013) or many other 
“things” (Salter 2015; Amicelle et al. 2015), and these actants come together to form 
provisional relations of actor-networks (Law 2008). Actants have agential features in that they 
are a part of assemblages, where actions are “the emergent product of myriad interacting forces 
and bodies that collide, respond, react, and counteract one another” (Mitchell 2014, 12; also see 
Aradau 2010; Balzacq and Dunn Cavelty 2016). Surveillance assemblages, for example, 
connect technologies such as biometric data collection and body scanners in a way that 
resembles Foucault’s panopticon (Muller et al. 2016). While generating important insights, this 
approach does not systematically specify the mechanisms through which technology works and 
does not bring us much closer to an understanding of how ICT shapes international 
negotiations.  
The concept of inscriptions comes closer to addressing our analytical needs by “making 
distant events and processes visible, mobile and calculable in terms of documents, charts, 
forms, reports, signs and graphs” (Walters 2002, 84). Inscriptions are the technologies through 
which actors seek to translate the messiness of the world— in the laboratory, the battleﬁeld or 
the market—into tangible knowledge that is concrete and visible enough for governing 
purposes (Aradau and Huysmans 2014). While not an STS scholar and not explicitly making 
use of the notion of inscription, Branch (2011) studies the role of maps in processes of state 
formation in exactly this way. He demonstrates that “new mapmaking technologies changed 
how actors thought about political space, political organization, and political authority” (Branch 
2011, 1), subsequently influencing their ideas of accepted governance. In a more recent article, 
Branch (2017) claims that digital mapping technologies structure territorial negotiations in 
unanticipated ways, because they visualize territory differently from paper maps. Similarly, 
while not using the concept of inscription, Der Derian (2003) focus on how technological 
developments have resulted in new modes of representation in warfare, changing the way 
soldiers perceive the battlefield and how they act in it accordingly. 
 These different conceptual answers to the relationship between materiality and the social 
insist on the co-constitution of technology and practice. Unfortunately, concepts such as 
assemblage, and actant lack analytical precision when it comes to identifying the mechanisms 
of co-constitution. The concept of inscription, in turn, is useful, but limits the role of 
technology to representations of reality. It does not encompass that people can use technology 
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as tools to physically aid in actions on the material world, thereby changing it (nuclear 
weapons, for example, are not inscriptions). Moreover, as Nexon and Pouliot (2013) have 
argued, there is a discrepancy between ANT and international relations theory, in the sense that 
ANT tends to focus on concrete micro-processes, whereas international relations theories 
predominantly revolve around macro-processes. 
The next sections add to the international relations literature on technology by responding to 
the challenges of analytical precision and relation to macro-phenomena. We show that 
affordance is a theoretical concept geared for an analysis of the forms of action that 
technologies make possible – but also that these affordances shape macro-phenomena such as 
national interests, negotiations and, ultimately, international governance.  
 
Theorizing technology in practice: An affordance approach 
 To explore track-change diplomacy and precisely identify how ICT and international 
practices relate, requires combining insights from STS, organization, media and communication 
studies as well as practice theory. Specifically, we introduce the notion of affordance, 
understood as possibilities for action – i.e. how an object or technology both enables and 
constrains the tasks that users can possibly perform with it (Evans et al. 2017, 36). 
Cognitive psychologist James J. Gibson developed the notion of affordance in 1977 to 
explain how people orient themselves to objects in their world in terms of the possibilities these 
objects afford for action. Donald Norman (1988) popularized affordance in studies of human-
machine interaction, documenting examples of “bad design.” Affordances are now key to how 
social sciences conceptualized technology’s role in society (e.g. Hutchby 2001; Hine 2008). 
The concept is relational – representing potential interactions between people and technology, 
rather than being a property of either alone. This relational view also explains why there is no 
singular theory of affordances, as each emerges based on the technology’s material features and 
contextual functionality (Evans et al. 2017, 36). 
Casting an everyday perspective on technology with our affordance approach, we are 
inspired by organizational scholars such as Orlikowski who developed the term “technology-in-
use” (Orlikowski et al. 1995) to point out that technologies seldom bring predictable effects to 
social life. Instead, technological artifacts operate within a web of organizational, occupational 
and institutional forces. A practice perspective on technology accounts for the fact that people, 
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organizations and states do not always “realize the apparent potential of a technology when they 
use it” (Majchrzak and Markus 2013, 3), and can sometimes use technology in ways the 
designers never intended. An affordance approach highlights that technology creates conditions 
for specific forms of human agency, and thus, contrary to most STS- and ANT-inspired 
international relations scholarship, we do not see technology as having agency in and of itself.. 
 To understand why different individuals and organizations do different things with the 
same technology requires understanding how cultures and habits shape our use of technology. 
At the same time, we cannot reduce the use of technology to human attributes such as culture, 
norms or habits. We have to understand it in relation to what actions the technology makes 
possible. The concept of affordance expresses this interrelation between technological 
functionality and social practice. An affordance approach is agnostic to particular features of a 
technology and, instead, asks what combination of features enable and constrain the ways 
people use technology (Zammuto et al. 2007, 752).3  
To develop this concept for international relations theory, we focus on three affordances of 
ICT that we have identified as significant influences in diplomatic negotiations: shareability, 
visualization and immediacy. 
 
Shareability  
 The first affordance of ICT is what we refer to as shareability. Advances in ICT enable a 
large number of actors to work on a single (or similar) document across different locations, with 
several practical implications. Firstly, it can broaden participation in an organization’s decision-
making processes by including people who may otherwise be working on the periphery. Virtual 
collaboration increases the potential for bringing people from different organizations and 
disciplines together, while documenting their decision rationales and work processes in real 
time (Zammuto 2007, 756). Secondly, it fosters a sense of collaboration and transparency, as it 
streamlines the ability to not only share but also integrate others’ knowledge (Zammuto et al. 
2007, 755). In international negotiations this translates into connecting capital cities more 
closely to their diplomats abroad. It also affords a more inclusive, de-centralized organization 
of foreign policy that incorporates other ministries and parliaments, and potentially even sub-
                                                 
3 Technology features are the ways “that [a technology’s] physical and/or digital materials are arranged into 
particular forms that endure across differences in place and time” (Leonardi 2012: 42) 
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state actors. Enhanced shareability makes rapid feedback possible by enabling quick probes and 
clarifications from varied sources. 
 While enhanced shareability affords more input from capitals, in large multilateral settings 
that negotiate on a daily basis, the massive expansion of individuals involved in diplomatic 
negotiations is likely to result in the individual negotiator losing control. The lack of centralized 
procedures coupled with the high speed of back-and-forth negotiations leads to power emerging 
from the negotiation process, as we will explain further below. 
 
Visualization 
The second affordance of ICT is what we call visualization. It affords the ability to observe 
entire work processes in action from end-to-end, represented through language or images that 
aid our thought processes in important ways. How we visualize certain phenomena affects how 
we address them. The philosophers and cognitive scientists Clark and Chalmers refer to “active 
externalism” to highlight how our environment drives cognitive processes (1998, 7). Objects 
and technologies help us to not only do things differently, but also shape the way we think 
(Clark and Chalmers 1998, 8). We reduce the computational load of our brain by manipulating 
external devices and cultural artifacts such as maps and texts to solve convoluted problems. 
While this sort of visualization is important for cognitive processes on an individual level, it is 
even more relevant in collective decision-making. Visualization is an important element of 
communication (Weber 2008). Visualization aids understanding, it helps keeping a “live 
record” and enables collective sense making as “people figure out how to respond” (Zammuto 
et al. 2007, 754). 
Visualization fundamentally underpins the sorts of solutions that diplomats identify in 
international conflicts. When diplomats negotiate over territorial disputes, the ways in which 
they draw up the territory constitutively affects the course of negotiations and the solutions that 
will emerge (Branch 2012; Branch 2017). Similarly, when diplomats visualize the object of 
their negotiations in text form, and signify changes to the text with the help of track-changes, 
bold, or brackets, then they will express the national position in the international dispute in the 
form of text edits. They seek the solution to a particular dispute with the help of drafting 
exercises, as opposed to drawing a boundary on a map. In other words, how diplomats visualize 
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the object of diplomatic negotiation has constitutive effects on how they establish the national 
position towards the object, and how they identify a compromise. 
 
 
Immediacy 
The third affordance that we wish to highlight is immediacy. ICT enables “unprecedented 
speed of access to materials and world events as they happen” (Conole and Dyke 2004, 116). 
Despite the wealth of information now within reach, speed can raise issues of quality and imply 
lacking reflection or critical judgment. The speed with which individuals can now exchange 
information has also shifted expectations in terms of response times. Organization scholars 
have shown how this intensifies working patterns, with responses expected almost immediately 
and an increasing number of back-and-forth edits amongst more authors than in the past 
(Conole and Dyke 2004, 116). Today diplomats create and recreate documents, and constantly 
negotiate meanings in rapid feedback circles within the EU.  
Communication speed has a phenomenological effect:  
[Speed] promotes a more pragmatic, reflexive immediate response to new 
information, as it is pixilated across our screens. This can be said to be particularly 
true of email, where nowadays users are bombarded with so much information that 
there is a tendency to skim read and adopt a surface approach in terms of reacting to 
responses and requests (Conole and Dyke 2004, 118). 
While speed tends to reduce diplomats’ and leaders’ attention span in their everyday 
activities, they can consciously counteract these tendencies when dealing with issues of vital 
national interest. Under these circumstances they will undertake their best efforts to remain 
focused. The literature surrounding cognitive psychology and social practices suggests that 
when difficulties arise, people will raise their awareness (for an overview see Hopf 2017). In 
other words, in moments of crisis, deliberate reflection replaces default automaticity 
(Baumeister and Bargh 2014; Bourdieu 2007).  
For this reason, a crucial aspect of the technology-diplomacy interaction is not just how 
word processing software speeds up the circulation of texts, but also how negotiators handle 
that speed, how they experience and assess it – and ultimately, how that shapes international 
relations. For example, the introduction of the telegraph in the 1830s revolutionized diplomacy 
13 
 
(Nickles 2009). The technology obviously made it possible to speed up the transfer of 
messages, but it did more than that. It provoked counter-moves from diplomats keen to protect 
their autonomy abroad. It also led foreign ministries to compose more concise messages 
because telegraph services were expensive, thereby changing the language of diplomacy 
(Nickles 2009, 3). 
 We expect that in highly institutionalized multilateral settings where continuous 
international negotiations take place, the affordance of immediacy will result in shorter 
attention spans during day-to-day negotiations, unless the organization has a slow moving 
deliberative culture. By contrast, when one-off negotiations of vital national interest are on the 
table, participants will do their utmost to increase their attention span and diplomatic focus. 
Summing up our theory, in accordance with the affordance approach, we do not make 
causal claims, but specify conditions of possibility. Thus, we do not predict whether track-
change diplomacy will lead to compromise solutions in specific negotiations; the practice does 
not determine specific outcomes. Diplomats themselves do not know whether their efforts will 
succeed, but they use track-change diplomacy as their go to approach to solve disputes. Nor do 
we predict precisely when loss of authorship will occur or when the negotiating parties will 
agree upon a text that none of them intended. We propose necessary, not sufficient conditions: 
in large multilateral settings operating under increased time pressure and with a loaded agenda, 
track-change diplomacy can make smooth negotiations possible, with the side effect that in 
moments when diplomats lose focus, it can lead to a loss of control. Inversely, when diplomats 
and leaders have made key national interests explicit, they will do their best to remain focused 
and retain some measure of control. 
 
Ethnographic methods: participant observation, documents and interviews 
This section briefly outlines our ethnographic approach while our appendix provides details 
on the diplomatic setting, sources, methods, analytical strategy and relevant literature on EU 
negotiations and ethnography in international relations scholarship. Our technology-in-practice 
approach implies an inductive methodology. As mentioned in the introduction, observers of 
diplomacy would not necessarily know about the existence of track-change diplomacy unless 
they became privy to the practice. 
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 By analyzing how diplomats conduct negotiations in the EU’s multi-level system, we focus 
on the Coreper (Committee of Permanent Representatives): the diplomatic engine room where 
ambassadors of the EU member states negotiate. Coreper meets in Brussels every week and 
prepares the Council of Ministers in its various formations. At Coreper, the ambassadors 
negotiate many of the politically contentious issues that their subordinates cannot solve at 
working group level. Coreper is not very visible to the general public and operates largely 
behind the scenes. As such, this forum resolves a significant number of issues on a de facto 
basis during its meetings, although national ministers in the Council are the ones who hold the 
legislative power (Lewis 2016).  
The EU is not a typical international organization, which raises the question of 
generalizability to other multilateral settings. Yet, in aspects pertaining to track-change 
diplomacy, the EU does not substantially differ from other multilateral organizations. First, 
while Coreper interacts frequently thereby affecting the mechanics of track-change diplomacy, 
equivalent bodies in the UN or NATO also meet regularly (Pouliot 2016b). Second, the EU has 
substantive areas in which it does not take decisions unanimously, but by Qualified Majority 
Voting, which may affect the speed of negotiations and make them even faster. However, in 
substance we can observe the same mechanisms in areas where the EU takes decisions by 
unanimity – even during major treaty revisions such as the Lisbon Treaty for example 
(Interview 21.11.2014; Interview 12.12.2014). Third, the binding status of EU legislation and 
the extensive powers of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) might influence the mechanics of 
track-change diplomacy. But again, we have identified the same mechanisms in areas in which 
the ECJ does not have any jurisdiction, and in non-legally binding documents. Lastly, one 
might argue that the EU is a special case because of the high degree of trust between frequently 
interacting parties. While EU negotiators do not distrust each other to the extent that warring 
parties do, the EU’s working environment certainly contends with the same interpersonal 
tensions as we expect in other large organizations. 
In fact, we find similar patterns of track-change diplomacy identified in the EU in other 
multilateral organizations such as the UN (Riles 1998), UNESCO (Schaefer 2017) and NATO. 
Also more hybrid multilateral institutional environments, such as the Contact Group on Piracy 
(Bueger 2017) exhibit similar dynamics. While diplomats also use track-changes when drafting 
bilateral agreements, we do not expect bilateral diplomacy to have the exact same 
characteristics. We can attribute these differences to norms and habits typically found in 
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legalized, multilateral organizations with many countries involved, compared to the less 
institutionalized practices of bilateral diplomacy (Pouliot 2011). The number of actors involved 
in the negotiation process also makes a difference. Moreover, we cannot expect the same track-
change dynamics when states’ vital national interests are at stake or when they are deliberately 
seeking to delay agreements. 
We gathered most of the empirical material during two-and-a-half months of participant 
observation in the permanent representation of an EU member state and in the Council of 
Ministers in Brussels in 2014. During this period, one of the authors attended Coreper meetings. 
She also attended numerous working group meetings and Council meetings, as well as the 
consultations prior to Council and Coreper meetings between Ministers and the ambassador, 
and between attachés and the ambassador. The other author worked in the Department of 
European Policy of a member state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a year (2010-2011) where 
she helped prepare European Council and Council of Ministers meetings and participated in 
drafting instructions, while attending various meetings in Brussels.  
The participant observations inform the core of the analysis. In addition, we analyzed 266 
internal documents that were circulated in preparation for Coreper meetings during the two-
and-a-half month period. These documents consist primarily of draft legislation with suggested 
text edits, presidency compromise solutions to outstanding issues of negotiations, instructions 
from a member state, and diplomats’ summaries of negotiations.  
We supplemented the participant observations with insights from numerous open-ended 
interviews both authors conducted during the period 2007-2018 with among others active and 
former Coreper ambassadors, Council secretariat officials, Members of the European 
Parliament, and employees of the Commission. The interviews served to clarify observed 
incidents. We have anonymized informants (and most country names) to respect their 
confidentiality and protect informants’ identities. 
The participant observations provide exceptional insights to the day-to-day proceedings of 
negotiations, but also have certain limitations. First, due to the limited time we were allowed to 
spend in the Permanent Representation and the Council, it was impossible to follow one piece 
of legislation through from inception by the Commission to its final adoption by the Council 
and the European Parliament. To be able to analyze the entire negotiation process, we therefore 
had to rely on different pieces of legislation in their respective stages. Second, conducting 
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participant observation also meant that we could not select the dossier (i.e. a particular 
negotiated text) on the basis of pre-defined criteria. Instead, we studied dossiers as they 
unfolded in front of our eyes, without knowing how they would develop. So, rather than 
concentrating the analysis on one piece of legislation, we highlight more general patterns of 
negotiations as we observed them across different cases. This aligns with the inductive method 
of “practice tracing,” that seeks to “map the ways of doing things that […] characterize a given 
social configuration” (Pouliot 2014, 273) and then analytically generate broader patterns from 
these concrete observations.  
 
Track-change diplomacy in the EU 		
From delivering post by wagon to today’s word processing software, the nature of 
diplomacy has advanced alongside ICT. As the French historian Fernand Braudel (1995[1966]) 
explains, in the 16th century, the “[s]tatesmen and ambassadors, whom we usually imagine with 
weighty matters on their minds, are often preoccupied by the arrival or delays of the mail” 
(Braudel, quoted in Fletcher 2015, 114). Uncertainty about not just when, but if letters and 
documents would ever reach the envoy hindered international negotiations. The horse carriage, 
the improvement of road and rail traffic led to incremental improvements in communications, 
but prior to the late 19th century, limited communication was still a major obstacle to diplomacy 
(Black 2010; 49). As late as 1980s, junior diplomats from EU member states were sitting up all 
night at the embassy in Brussels where the one computer dedicated to receive confidential 
material was located. They waited for draft conclusions, then photocopied them and slid them 
under the hotel room door of the members of the national delegation at 4am (Interview 
18.04.2018). 
Some characteristics that defined negotiations in Coreper in 1958, when it was established, 
are equally important today. Notably, negotiations center on textual edits. This is not surprising 
given that many of the word processing features used today “build historically on aesthetics, 
discourse genres, means of distribution, concepts of authorship and ownership, etc., that were 
developed through the media of paper” (Hull 2012, 261). In other words, the affordances of 
Visualization on paper and word processing features are quite similar, meaning that they affect 
diplomatic negotiations in similar, albeit non-identical ways. 
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By contrast, advancements in ICT have considerably impacted on the affordances of 
immediacy and shareability. As one senior diplomat recalls,  
Without thinking, we have just increased the speed and complexity. We handle 
dossiers just as fast as we did when we were 15 [member states] as we do when 
we are 28 countries around the table. Basically, enlargement [in 2004, the EU 
grew from 15 to 25 with the Central and Eastern European countries] wouldn’t 
have been possible without email, mobile phones and software (Interview 
18.04.2018).  
Track-change diplomacy as the combination of advanced ICT and diplomatic practices has 
three defining characteristics: shared authorship which involves including many people from 
geographically dispersed regions and institutions, a particular aesthetic centering on textual 
edits with the help of word processing features and a high speed of negotiations and textual 
circulation. This section will show how in multilateral settings that negotiate on a continuous 
basis, these three characteristics collectively shape key international relations categories: 
negotiators define the national interest as textual edits in a compressed two-level game (Putnam 
1988), they reach compromises through aesthetically circumscribed drafting exercises, and 
power is emergent. In some instances, when non-vital national interests are involved, the 
characteristics of track-change diplomacy can result in diplomats losing control over the 
negotiation process and even adopting legislation that none of the negotiating parties intended. 
 
Shareability: From shared authorship to loss of authorship in drafting EU legislation 
The first characteristic of track-change diplomacy is shareability, given the large number of 
actors who work on a single document across different locations. When one follows the 
circulation of a draft for an ordinary legislative act through the EU, it is clear that massive 
coordination efforts are required for reaching a compromise, which track-change technology 
makes possible. 
The European Commission initiates a text with the involvement of several Directorate 
Generals (DGs) and consultations with member states and stakeholders. The text then goes to 
the Council of Ministers, where it passes through various working groups. The member state 
representatives as part of these working groups can receive instructions from multiple domestic 
ministries, and potentially their national parliaments. The text will then go to the Coreper 
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ambassador meeting before the Council of Ministers decides on it. Various political parties 
negotiate over the text in the European Parliament, and the EU has only adopted the legal 
document once the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have reached an 
agreement (for more detail see the methodological appendix).  
This brief elaboration highlights the many different hands through which the text circulates. 
As one diplomat explains:  
There is not one author. It is a collective enterprise. Many people are involved. Many 
institutions are involved. It is the machine of searching for a compromise, which writes 
the text (Interview, 20.11.2014).  
Beyond the technology of track-changes, social norms guide the changes that 
individuals are allowed to make, so that reaching a compromise between so many actors 
becomes possible. For example, member states have to show flexibility wherever they can. 
They have also learned to aggregate positions. To get edits approved, others need to support 
one’s position. Aggregation is crucial to make the interactions between 28 member states, the 
various national ministries, and the EU institutions more meaningful.	
One of the consequences of shareability as an affordance for international diplomacy is 
that capital cities can potentially better oversee the negotiations: 
I remember, previously, you said: ‘Okay, I take this one,’ and then I had to 
defend the choice at home, but today you say, ‘give me five minutes, and I’ve 
spoken to my Prime Minister.’ The autonomy of Coreper ambassadors is gone 
(Interview 15.04.2018). 
However, the implications of shareability are not as straightforward. The fact that track-
change diplomacy allows the text to circulate through so many different iterations, creates a 
situation of shared authorship that can occasionally result in a loss of authorship. As a Member 
of the European Parliament explains: “so many people are involved, you cannot foresee what 
the outcome […] is going to be,” (Interview, 20.11.2014). Contrary to what we commonly 
believe – that writing is a case of “highly controlled sign usage” (Hirschauer 2016, 55, authors’ 
translation) – the intricate circulation process that negotiation documents go through means that 
diplomats can, at times, lose control over the production of those signs. While bureaucracies are 
generally able to expose a similar phenomenon of loss of authorship resulting from a specific 
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bureaucratic culture (as per Weber), observing it in diplomatic negotiations, where diplomats 
are supposed to represent the interests of states as independent actors, is considerably more 
fascinating, as it opposes the dominant understanding of what diplomacy is all about. 
 
Visualization: Using word processing software to reach agreements  
 The second characteristic of track-change diplomacy relates to the affordance of 
Visualization. In the EU, negotiations are extremely aesthetic and text-oriented. Diplomats use 
various Microsoft Word functions to highlight proposed text edits and bring out the different 
positions of the negotiators. Each of these functions fulfils the role of making changes more 
visible and therefore allowing diplomats to negotiate around those changes. For example, the 
table with four columns (see Figure 1) is a typical stylistic device used during trialogues.4 The 
table permits three institutions – the Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council – 
to add their amendments to individual paragraphs side by side. This makes it easy for a reader 
to identify and compare them, while the fourth column is left for the compromise solution. The 
table works well for three negotiating parties, but it would be significantly more challenging to 
                                                 
4 Trialogues refer to negotiations between the European Commission, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 
and the Rapporteur of the European Parliament. 
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use for all 28 member states. Tools with different affordances for Visualizing text edits, such as 
the track-change function, are more useful under these circumstances.  
 
Figure 1: Example of table used at trialogue negotiations. 
 In terms of formatting, Presidency suggestions for a compromise text at Coreper 
ambassadorial meetings usually have “new text in Bold and underlined. Deleted text is in 
Strikethrough,” (Legislative proposal by a member state, 11.11.2014). Changes the Council 
Legal Service proposed for legal accuracy are Bold and double underlined and Double 
strikethrough. Grey shading serves to highlight politically contentious issues. Alternatively, 
diplomats can use red font. [Square brackets] indicate that the negotiators have not yet agreed 
on something. Footnotes commonly serve to write down the delegations’ suggestions for 
modifications to the text, or to highlight delegations’ scrutiny and parliamentary reservations. 
Occasionally, they use the comments function. 
 All of these tools are visual markers that allow the delegations to focus on specific passages 
of the text, while letting the rest fade into the background. The comparison between new and 
old text becomes easily discernible. These tools help to increase the speed of textual revisions, 
but they also draw out certain passages from the document’s overall context. As a result, 
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diplomats can easily focus on the details of particular wordings, over which they then negotiate 
out of context. They can lose the overview of the entire text and therefore lose sight of the 
actual subject of their negotiations, contributing to a loss of authorship. 
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Figure 2: Examples of Presidency suggestions for a compromise text. 
 
Figure 3: Example of a track-changed document. 
23 
 
 Before text edits reach a point where the Presidency consolidates them into a single set of 
proposed revisions, national delegations use track-changes to make their suggestions to the text. 
Compared to the use of bold and underlined formatting, track-changes lead to the propositions’ 
lower degree of authority, as the delete option is already an integral command function. At the 
same time, the suggestive nature of track-changes inspires to create new text. Using track-
changes allows readers to track multiple authors, which is unnecessary in the case of one set of 
changes the Presidency has consolidated. Although technically possible, this tracing of 
authorship becomes impractical when many individuals negotiate over a text. 
 
Immediacy: The speed of text circulation through the EU apparatus 
ICT permits a third characteristic of track-change diplomacy: immediacy. To an outsider, 
the EU might appear to be a slow-moving bureaucracy; but for the people involved in the 
internal negotiations, they occur at a very high speed. The fast circulation of text among many 
actors that advancements in ICT make possible, also generates expectations of fast responses. 
Being constantly bombarded with emails can be quite stressful: “If you haven’t been up during 
the night to go to the toilet [and check your mobile phone], then people cannot understand why 
you haven’t answered” (Interview 18.04.2018). 
As one senior diplomat notes: 
Things need to be very swift, because we are working up against a deadline, so 
it’s seen as good service by the Presidency to send an email and say: ‘Here is the 
document,’ and they will often send it out at 4pm in the afternoon for a meeting at 
10 or 11am the next day. This wasn’t the way we operated previously. Before 
mobile phones, there was a compromise text and then you would have one or two 
days to react. Time has become compressed. Sometimes I receive a new text in 
the rotating door into Lipsius [the Council of Ministers building in Brussels] on 
the way into the meeting (Interview 18.04.2018). 
The high speed may, in part, be self-perpetuating with the urge to respond quickly emerging 
from shared experiences of rapid text circulation. But it is also due to a more or less implicit 
norm of measuring success on the basis of how many texts diplomats have approved. To reach 
a speedy agreement and get legislation through the apparatus might be one of the most crucial 
objectives underlying the negotiation process today.  
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ICT in tandem with individual role perceptions support fast negotiations. Given Coreper’s 
substantial agenda and the fact that there are 28 member states around the table, the 
ambassadors are not allowed to speak for more than three minutes per item. They often make 
explicit that they comply with these rules or apologies if they do not: “Sorry I took up a lot of 
time there, but I think it was important,” (Coreper 1, 18.2.2015). The silent procedure also 
enhances the speed of negotiations. It implies that Coreper has adopted a proposal, unless a 
member state objects within one of the deadlines specified by the Presidency (General 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU 2011, 56). Furthermore, “agreed language” expedites 
searching for compromises. Agreed language refers to formulations that diplomats have agreed 
upon in previously approved texts. Diplomats copy-paste these directly into new texts that 
address similar issues. The purpose is to save time and to avoid replicating the same complex 
procedures of searching for a compromise. One possible danger of this procedure is that the 
insertion of agreed language passages into a slightly different context may create new, 
unintended meanings. 
The three affordances of ICT – shareability, Visualization and immediacy –
fundamentally shape how negotiators define national interests, how they reach compromises, 
and what constitutes power in large multilateral settings. 
 
Defining the national interest as text edits 
One of the key questions in diplomacy is how the national interest gets represented and 
performed. Concretely, national capitals write the national interest in their instructions to the 
EU delegations. Yet, as we will show in this section, the way in which capitals produce these 
instructions makes it clear that EU negotiations do not center around pre-defined interests, but 
rather around the performance of interests expressed through text revisions using a particular 
software that also shapes the way diplomats conduct these edits. In short, the text helps produce 
national interests – just as much as the national interests are manifest in the text. The somewhat 
emblematic national interest emerges out of the negotiation process, based on the three 
affordances we have identified.  
The high speed of ICT means that email and mobile devices afford almost complete 
flexibility in terms of being able to constantly edit the text. Previously, the capital sent 
instructions to the embassy (since instructions represent the government’s view), but in practice 
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it was often the representative in the mission abroad who wrote a first draft the capital then 
approved. These days, this has taken a radical turn with instructions sometimes drafted at the 
same time as negotiations take place. A diplomat highlights: “We work a lot with the 
instructions. It may as well go back and forth a number of times” (Interview, 20.04.2015). 
The affordance of shareability, together with the imperative of high-speed, circumscribe the 
national interest. The Presidency needs to aggregate national positions between multiple 
delegations, and there are unwritten rules on how many edits (i.e. track-changes) one country is 
allowed to make. As one senior diplomat in the Council secretariat explains: 
It happens regularly that a country uses too many track-changes and then it has no 
impact. We simply ignore it. We can’t take that seriously. We cannot take that 
much from one single delegation. The delegation must find out what’s most 
important (Interview 15.04.2018). 
The affordance of ICT Visualization shapes the aesthetic form that a national interest takes. 
A discussion during the negotiations of the Single European Sky 2+ (SES 2+) legislation, which 
regulates EU airspace, illustrates how the aesthetics afforded by Microsoft Word enact the 
national interest. To understand this negotiation context, it is important to know that Spain and 
the United Kingdom’s ongoing sovereignty dispute over Gibraltar complicated the SES 2+ 
negotiations. Both parties disagreed about whether to include Gibraltar airport in the legislation. 
The ambassadors at Coreper could not find a solution to this key issue concerning national 
sovereignty, so they left the topic for the Transport Council on the 3 December 2014. The UK 
expressed its national position in the form that it “will only accept a general approach if it is 
absolutely clear that Gibraltar will be included, without footnotes in 5 and 2.” For Spain, the 
national position was to include a text in the SES 2+ legislation, which recommended 
“temporally [to suspend] the application to this airport until an agreement has been reached 
between Spain and the UK.” To move the legislation forward, the Presidency proposed to: 
[…] put paragraph 5 in square brackets, and include a footnote stating ‘the issue as to 
how in the text to reflect Gibraltar will depend on the results of talks between the UK 
and Spain.’ The other two footnotes will be deleted, and I hope that this will be a neutral 
solution. […] There are precedents for this type of solution. The proposal that we are 
making is that we would have a general approach, paragraph 5 in square brackets, with a 
footnote. 
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Spain responded: 
The solution is neutral, so we are able to approve the solution. We still stick to our 
solution, but with a view to reaching an agreement we can accept that solution.  
To the surprise of those present, the British Minister refused the proposal on the grounds that it 
“is not a neutral approach.” Given that the remaining interested parties thought it was a neutral 
solution, the Presidency had the member states vote on the general approach with the 
compromise solution, although it concerned an issue of vital national interest. The UK voted 
against it, but the general approach passed because it was in a policy area of Qualified Majority 
Voting. This illustrates that when vital national interests are involved, the parties do their 
utmost to retain control.  
 
The reaching of compromises through drafting exercises: Getting to the clean text 
As indicated in the example above, negotiations take place through text edits, and the EU 
has developed a real skill of reaching compromise solutions through “drafting exercises” – a 
process where diplomats draft and redraft texts until they have identified an agreeable solution 
in the wording of a text. The speed and aesthetic affordances of ICT are crucial for the practices 
through which negotiators seek compromises in large multilateral settings.  
 One strategy of collective drafting, for which the affordances of shareability and immediacy 
are key, is to split the text into pieces that negotiators then circulate in parallel with the more 
official negotiation process. Whereas they circulate the official documents in full length with 
track-changes, the use of mobile devices encourages small snippets and fragments of text to 
circulate at the same time, as member states cut and paste their way to compromise. As one 
ambassador explains: 
We had an Eastern Partnership summit where we needed to refer to language 
on ‘European aspirations for Ukraine.’ The working group had negotiated long 
and hard and couldn’t get any further. At the one end, you had [Member State 
1] blocking. They could not accept any recognition, any aspirations for Ukraine 
whatsoever. On the other end you had [Member State 2] and some of the other 
[States], [Member State 3] and [Member State 4] that couldn’t get enough. I 
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was tasked by the Presidency to find a compromise. So between two Coreper 
meetings, I worked with the External Service. First, I called my colleague from 
[Member State 2]. Then I sent a text to my [Member State 1] colleague, and we 
pushed it back and forth over the phone. And then they started to see 
themselves in the text. And then at Coreper, the compromise was presented 
orally… (Interview 15.04.2018). 
These are the hidden layers of negotiations that ICT makes possible. 
The Visualization of ICT also shapes how negotiators work with textual edits, and how they 
reach compromises. In the negotiations concerning Council Conclusions for an Education, 
Youth, Culture and Sport Council for instance, how to treat e-books and regular books became 
a contentious issue between Northern and Southern states. The text the Presidency initially 
proposed explicitly referenced the differences in VAT applied to regular books and e-books. 
However, Northern states argued that VAT does not lie within the competency of the Council 
for Education, Youth, Culture and Sport, but in that of the Economic and Financial Council. For 
this reason, they wanted to omit the statement. Given this resistance, the Presidency changed 
the text to:  
promote reading as a tool to spread knowledge, enhance creativity, support access to 
culture, cultural diversity,[…] develop awareness of a European identity and to support 
the application to e-books of the same treatment applied to printed books5 (diplomatic 
notes).6   
Several member states still opposed this text, so the Presidency made further changes: 
promote reading as a tool to spread knowledge, enhance creativity, support access to 
culture, cultural diversity, [...] develop awareness of a European identity and to 
consider to apply support the application to e-books of the same treatment applied to 
printed books (ibid.). 
The like-minded states that disagreed with this proposal developed their own compromise text, 
which read: 
                                                 
5 New proposal from the Presidency. 
6 We copied the quotes’ formatting from the original internal documents in which they appeared.   
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promote reading, through printed books as well as e-books, as a tool to spread 
knowledge, enhance creativity, support access to culture, and cultural diversity, [...] 
develop awareness of a European identity and to support the application to e-books of 
the same treatment applied to printed books (ibid.).   
As this text was not satisfying the Southern states, one state suggested another alternative 
wording:  
promote reading as a tool to spread knowledge, enhance creativity, support access to 
culture, cultural diversity, [...] develop awareness of a European identity, and to apply 
support the application also applying to e-books of the same treatment applied to printed 
books, except where different treatment results from EU-law (ibid.).  
But this wording was unacceptable to both groups, so the ambassadors at Coreper were unable 
to agree and left the issue for the Council of Ministers. The final compromise text in the 
Conclusions on a Work Plan for Culture (2015-2018) reads:  
promote reading as a tool to spread knowledge, enhance creativity, support access to 
culture and cultural diversity and develop awareness of a European identity, taking into 
account the various conditions applied to e-books and physical books.  
The shareability, visualization and immediacy of ICT allow many actors to negotiate at high 
speed around textual edits. It also means that the substance of the negotiations can occasionally 
fade from view in a quest to get the wording right, and with a focus on only the contentious 
textual passages, not the full document. During negotiations, the text acquires a particular 
meaning. Thus, in the example above, the claim that “equal treatment of e-books and regular 
books” refers to an equal VAT is not apparent from the language itself; it only emerged in 
relation to the different positions at the negotiation table.  
Once the text is enshrined in law, it often acquires a new meaning that is in line with the 
practices of legal interpretation. This legal meaning can be quite different from the meaning 
that emerged during negotiations or that the diplomats who wrote the text intended.7  
                                                 
7 	Occasionally negotiators can deliberately leave text unclear, knowing that they are unable to solve disagreements 
– in tune with Kissinger’s understanding of constructive ambiguity (Jegen and Mérand 2004). However, at other 
times, the process can be automatic and unintentional.  
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In a dispute between the Council Legal Service and member states over the meaning of a 
clause in the EU’s Lisbon treaty, the Council Legal Service responded in an informal meeting 
(19.11.2014):  
Send us legal arguments about this, not political ones. Usually we stop at the letter 
of the treaty. I understand that you are not satisfied with it at all. […] We cannot 
rely too much on the history of treaty making, on the travaux preparatoires to the 
treaty, we have to find the arguments in the law as is. 
 Clearly, the text has gained a life of its own. 
 
Emergent power in track-change diplomacy 
One of the benefits of an affordance approach to technology is that it overrules the idea that 
technology has any automatic consequences, thereby allowing for human agency. Human 
agency does not disappear with technology; what a given technology and established societal 
practices offer shape its expression. Within international relations theory, scholars often see 
agency as an exclusive prerogative of the human domain involving intention and freedom of 
will – which is particularly evident in international negotiation studies (see Braun et al. 2018). 
A range of perspectives, from post-structuralism, over ANT to practice scholarship have 
criticized this assumption of conscious agency. For instance, practice scholars promote a logic 
of practice over a logic of consequences or appropriateness. This explains why Pouliot can 
quote a UN diplomat as saying: “Diplomatic issues are not resolved through the quality of 
arguments, but thanks to a capacity to imagine steps that people can engage in [and to find] the 
next step to rally people to move forward” (Pouliot 2016a, 16). 
However, this narrative still allocates agency and power with human agency and 
creativity. Our analysis of track-change diplomacy shows that multilateral negotiations are 
more radical. Writing diplomatic text cannot be reduced to human agency (i.e. moves of 
diplomats alone), but is shaped by technological affordances that significantly impact how 
diplomats think and handle text as a collective networked exercise. As we have demonstrated, 
the negotiation process itself takes an emergent character as ambassadors continuously circulate 
and edit text, while they experience being stripped of the agency they once had. 
 What we suggest here is that if it is not merely the meeting of different national 
interests, diplomats represent around a negotiation table, that produces the text, then track-
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change diplomacy enables power to work in a different way. Being influential as a diplomat 
entails being able to use technology effectively. This means being able to edit text and time 
interventions at a high speed. Of course, the size of member states will influence their ability to 
get edits approved, because individual voting weights in the Council determine a certain 
hierarchy and social pressures associated with that hierarchy (Pouliot 2016b; Towns and 
Rumelili 2017).  
It is clear that a small country cannot take the floor as the first [member state] each 
time. It would be totally out of place [...] It would also be noticed if we always have 
to say something to all agenda points (Interview 07.01.2015). 
 
 Ultimately, however, the most crucial diplomatic skill in terms of enhancing a state’s 
negotiating position is the ability to maneuver one’s edits through a complicated negotiation 
process. In this sense, the text becomes the object over which diplomats hold the negotiations. 
Power gets expressed both in the process of drafting and through the clean text as a collective 
achievement.  
The barometer of power (invisible to outsiders, and often to participants in the process) is 
whether a country’s most important text edits make it into the final version. Linguistic skills are 
important. Negotiators who can achieve balanced wording and possess a certain institutional 
memory to recall previously “agreed language” that they can reapply to new circumstances, are 
the most likely to embed their preferred solutions in the final document. As a senior diplomat in 
the Council Secretariat explains: 
If you are a competent negotiator, you are able to propose something that can easily 
slide into a text. You need to be textually economical with suggestions for changes. 
I remember [Member State X’s] ambassador […] suggested to the Prime Minister to 
put a comma in the text. We got the comma and it changed the meaning completely 
and it meant that the Commission couldn’t use the proposal for what they had 
planned to use it. Sometimes a surgical, technical and economical edit has a better 
chance than a complicated suggestion. Also because the latter can raise all kinds of 
questions from the others about what this means. Drafting skills are crucial for how 
lucky you are to get your proposals through (Interview 15.04.2018). 
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 Developing a strategy to subtly navigate one’s way through the different iterations of the 
text is important. As Riles (1999; 2006) points out, agency or politics do not disappear; rather 
they emerge in the ways in which diplomats manage amendments and procedures. Diplomats 
have to strategize their edits and interventions, based on the affordances particular technologies 
offer. Coalitions and negotiations occur so fast that a parallel conversation to the one at the 
negotiation table happens on the diplomats’ mobile phones and along the outskirts of the room. 
Diplomats send each other comments about how the meeting is developing, and they strategize 
about who should speak first. Being able to integrate the same textual revisions in the various 
fora through which the text circulates – and to make sure that one’s voice is heard and 
understood – also matters. At times this may require that negotiators reiterate their points, as an 
ambassador said during a Coreper meeting: “I have said this before, but I am happy to repeat.” 
At other times, it may require that an ambassador writes an edit of the text out by hand and 
passes it on to the Mertens (the assistant diplomat) who will photocopy and distribute the sheet 
to all Coreper participants, so that they can see the suggested revision in a hard copy in front of 
them. 
 Being able to fit into the collective track-change process significantly bears on the result. 
Power is emergent in these negotiations as it originates from specific social interactions and we 
cannot reduce it to the meeting of pre-existing national interests (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 
2014). However, as we have demonstrated in this article, how we use technologies both enables 
and constrains this emergence. Negotiations become a fluid maneuvering through textual edits 
with an uncertain impact on the final outcome. Ambassadors typically find out whether they 
won or lost a particular edit, when they read a revised version of the text with consolidated 
changes, but they do not always recall their starting position. Power is highly situational, 
embedded in the process of negotiations rather than clearly dispersed between involved parties. 
Moreover, diplomats do not own the text. Once they have negotiated it, lawyers will interpret it, 
and this will not necessarily align with the intended meaning that emerged from negotiations. 
As an ambassador said to his foreign minister “I would be curious to know who is ruling this 
whole thing” – he meant the European Union. 
 
Conclusion 
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The digital information and communication revolution has turned everyday multilateral 
negotiations into a semi-virtual space of constant exchanges and proposed edits. Today, a 
majority of multilateral negotiations take place via the computer screens, tablets and mobile 
phones of diplomats, whom distance may separate, but who negotiate 24/7. Track-change 
diplomacy – negotiating with the help of word processing software, supported by email and 
digital devices – has made the otherwise long and complicated process of editing documents to 
reach international compromises, quicker and more collaborative than ever. 
But technological advances and the ubiquitous nature of ICT do more than just facilitate 
negotiations. They also push negotiations in a particular direction, sometimes with unexpected 
consequences. To understand the role of track-changes, and ICT more generally, we developed 
the notion of affordance for international relations theory. Technological affordances – the way 
a technology both enables and constrains the tasks that users can possibly perform – lead us 
away from the idea that we can deduce the effects of a particular technology from its features. 
Instead, we can understand technology better by focusing on its enabling and constraining 
power for particular international practices. The methodological implications of this practice-
oriented approach are important. Rather than studying technology in isolation, it is necessary to 
work inductively to analyze how users employ technology in specific contexts. By turning our 
attention to the technology-in-practice that scholars often overlook, we can uncover how it 
shapes international negotiations. 
There are three main characteristics of track-change diplomacy the particular affordances of 
ICT shape. Shareability denotes shared authorship, visualization means a particular 
schematized design aesthetics and immediacy affords high-speed text circulation. Together 
these characteristics challenge established wisdom about diplomatic negotiations in 
institutionalized multilateral settings in at least three ways. Firstly, they affect how negotiators 
define national positions (as edits to the text more than as substantive positions originating from 
capital cities). Secondly, they impact how diplomats reach compromises (through collective 
drafting exercises by circulating snippets and track-changed documents, involving more authors 
and less time for reflection). And thirdly, they shape what constitutes power (the skillful use of 
language within specifically set design parameters, circumventing the diverging text edits to 
assert a preferred meaning). As our analysis has shown, the track-change function – originally 
intended by Microsoft Word to help a group of co-authors keep track of their changes in 
documents – may in fact lead to a loss of authorship and control of the negotiation process, 
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characterized by its networked complexity. Track-change diplomacy can thus provide an 
additional explanation for the occurrence of pathologies in international organizations that 
might help scholars to understand not only the outcomes of multilateral negotiations, but also 
their everyday bureaucratic operations (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). 
If international negotiations appear so strikingly different through a technology-in-practice 
lens, the same is likely the case for other phenomena in world politics, from international 
conflicts mediated on social media such as Twitter and Facebook to nuclear deterrence and 
cyber security. Just as barbed wire changed the logics of war in a symbolic and material sense 
(Barder 2016), digital technology shapes world politics – and does so in ways that designers did 
not necessarily intend. It is crucial that international relations scholars analyze the technologies 
that are currently merging physical, digital and biological worlds in the “Fourth Industrial 
Revolution”. Central to this revolution are technological breakthroughs in fields such as 
Artificial Intelligence, robotics, the Internet of Things and 3D printing, which will undoubtedly 
have wide-ranging implications over the coming years. However, international relations 
scholars need to think methodically about these technologies and analyze the practices they 
afford, instead of focusing on their abstract or idealized forms. This is the main value-adding 
contribution we believe a practice perspective can offer a study of technology in international 
relations. 
Supplemental information 
Online Ethnographic Methods Appendix, available at https://www.diploface.ku.dk,  
https://www.cardiff.ac.uk/people/view/330594-drieschova-alena and at the International 
Studies Quarterly data archive 
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Ethnographic methods: participant observation, documents and interviews  
 
Rebecca Adler-Nissen & Alena Drieschova 
 
 
In this appendix, we provide details on our overall research strategy, relevant literature on EU 
negotiations, the empirical material and context, the collection of data and analytical process. 
These methodological considerations and choices are important for our analysis, but due to 
space constraints, we could not fully develop them in the main article.  
 
This article represents collaborative research. As authors, we had different roles in the gathering 
of the empirical material. One of us (Author 1) was based in an EU capital, employed in a 
ministry of foreign affairs for one year working on European policy dealing with instructions to 
Coreper and the domestic side of the negotiations, but also attending several Council working 
group and Coreper meetings. The other (Author 2) conducted participant observation for two 
and a half months in Brussels, based in the permanent representation of an EU member state 
and in the Council, attending many Coreper and ambassadorial meetings. Both authors did 
rounds of in-depth interviews before and after these stints. 
 
It was our mutual interest in, and hands-on experience with, concrete diplomatic negotiations in 
the EU that led us to write the article together. By combining our insights and empirical 
material from observations of negotiations, we were able to develop a deeper and more 
complete understanding of the fascinating, but understudied phenomenon of track-change 
diplomacy.8  
 
We have structured the appendix in six sections. The first section presents the overall research 
design and case selection. The second section gives an overview of the EU and Coreper as a site 
for document negotiation and briefly discusses the existing literature on Coreper. The third 
section provides methodological details on our participant observation. The fourth section 
provides details on the different rounds of interviews we conducted. The fifth section briefly 
presents our analytical strategy and interpretation of the material. We end with a few words on 
ethics. 
 
1. Research design 
 
The purpose of our research has been to investigate how information and communication 
technology (ICT) shapes international negotiations with a particular focus on the EU. Our 
starting point, given our affordance approach, has been to analyse these negotiations from a 
practice perspective, which means that we look for ‘the action’ in everyday interactions. Thus, 
for instance, we analysed the drafting of compromise texts with a focus not simply on content, 
but on all the different processes that go into making that compromise.  
                                                 
8 From our initial conversations, we quickly realised that not only had we experienced similar 
and quite striking phenomena, we were also both convinced of the importance of bringing these 
phenomena to the attention of scholars of international negotiations. Indeed, if the ubiquitous 
adoption of information and communication technology transforms the international 
negotiations we study, we run the risk of our theories becoming irrelevant unless they reflect 
the changes in those phenomena. 
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To study track-change diplomacy from this starting point requires an inductive approach. 
Rather than testing hypotheses explore diplomats’ experiences and everyday doings, which then 
inform our conceptualisation. This analytical process involves (re)constructing the background 
knowledge and tacit insights of these practitioners, including the intersubjective rules of the 
diplomatic game and resources that are important for the performance of negotiation (see e.g. 
Bueger 2014; Pouliot 2007; Adler-Nissen 2014). The benefit of such inductive approach is that 
it provides insights into lived experience and is often able to point to things that at first sight 
might appear irrelevant or “non-political” (Wedeen 2010, 261-162). In short, our practice-
oriented research design focuses on everyday experiences and behavior to help us gain a deeper 
understanding of international negotiations (see Klotz and Lynch 2014, 57).  
 
Within the IR discipline, recent years have seen an increasing number of ethnographic and 
anthropologically-oriented studies, to a degree that there is talk not just of a practice turn, but an 
ethnographic turn (e.g. Vrasti 2008; Rancatore 2010; Wedeen 2010; MacKay and Levin 2015). 
In terms of interpretation of the practices we observe, we are inspired by Wedeen’s rendition of 
interpretive ethnography, which is “‘dual’, made up of what the ‘natives’ say, and what the 
researcher interprets” (2010, 264). This way of using participant observation and interviews 
involves stepping back from the observed and uncovering not just what happens, but also how 
social reality and meaning is constructed in the first place (Holstein and Gubrium 2008, 374-
375).  
 
Our research question and approach require that we focus on specific practices and zoom in on 
a few or one case (Silverman 2011, 56). We focus on one particular case: Coreper, the EU's 
diplomatic engine room where ambassadors negotiate on a weekly basis. To focus on Coreper 
requires engaging with at least two other diplomatic sites: the EU delegations (national 
embassies in Brussels) and national foreign ministries (in the capitals of EU member states). 
However, most of the action (which our analysis focuses on) takes place on computer screens, 
mobile phones and tablets when officials and diplomats draft text and circulate it electronically 
between each other.  
 
With our case selection, we do not aim to sample a representative case to infer or generalize 
about a larger population. Instead, and in tune with the practice-orientation, the potential of this 
case to give in-depth information about the phenomenon guided our case selection (Flyvbjerg 
2006, 236). As authors we had unique access and possibility to collect detailed information 
about a process that is usually closed to the outside world. However, as we also clarify in the 
main manuscript, this does not mean that what we observed is only applicable to the EU. In 
fact, our observations are relevant for other multilateral organizations, such as NATO and the 
UN, and for our understanding of diplomacy as such. 
 
 
2. The EU’s Coreper as a diplomatic site 
 
Coreper sits between the EU’s Council of Ministers on the one hand and the Council’s 
specialist working groups on the other. Initially it was meant to assist and prepare the foreign 
ministers’ negotiations in Brussels, but today it supports ministers in all their constellations 
(from trade to security and agriculture). Dossiers pass through it from working groups to the 
Council. Sometimes (including for some “political” texts such as Council resolutions), this is 
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simple progression, but often text passes backwards and forwards between the different levels 
of the Council’s decision-making machinery, with the final outcome taking shape. Members of 
Coreper are in a better place than anyone else in the Council to have an informed overview of 
current policy developments in the Union. Coreper plays an essential role in many of the 
Union’s high profile, cross-cutting negotiations: it negotiates and adopts EU law (mostly jointly 
with the European Parliament), it develops foreign and security policy as well as structural and 
agricultural policies, it adopts the EU budget, it steers enlargement negotiations and it 
negotiates GATT/ WTO rounds and individual trade disputes. Such negotiations involve 
judgements about the relative importance of diverse and important policy objectives. 
 
The ambassadors are normally senior diplomats with considerable experience. This, plus their 
role in preparing the work of the Council of Ministers and the meetings between the Heads of 
State and Government, gives their views considerable significance in national capitals and 
permits them to contribute to the setting of negotiating objectives and tactics. 
At a Coreper meeting, roles are well-established. Coreper ambassadors play the main role and 
more junior diplomats and attachés (officials at the embassies, often from other ministries than 
the ministries of foreign affairs), so-called ‘Mertens’9 and ‘Antici’10 play secondary roles. There 
are two meeting rooms at level 50 (actually the second floor) in the Justus Lipsius building, 
which is the second-most exclusive level (after level 80, reserved for the dinners and gatherings 
of the Heads of State and Government), reflecting the hierarchy of the Council, and Coreper as 
the most important forum (only superseded by the Council of Ministers and the European 
Council). Rooms are decorated with carpets, velour stripes, video screens and flowers, and 
dress code is formal for ambassadors as well as the translators sitting in booths, providing a 
solemn and serious atmosphere around the meetings.  
 
The ambassadors 
 
During a Coreper meeting, people constantly enter and leave the room as the topics of the 
negotiations change frequently – from the regulation of novel foods, over the safety standards 
of medical devices, to a reduction of plastic bags in the marine environment. Ambassadors are 
the only ones who remain in the room throughout the meeting. They will usually present 
arguments by saying e.g. “We, Austria”, embodying their state, but just as often they will use 
ambassador’s first name to indicate familiarity. The ambassadors’ role is highly 
institutionalized. What they say and how they say it is important. As in any other social 
interaction, exaggeration promotes understanding, as do imagery, facts, figures and examples. 
Generally, it is a good idea to speak clearly and to structure the intervention: “A Coreper classic 
is – ‘I have three points to make’” (Interview, 14.04.2015). Time is limited; an intervention 
should be no longer than three minutes, and ideally in the form of edits to the text. The ability 
to make oneself understood, enhances power. Reading instructions or mumbling into the 
microphone do not advance national interests. A diplomat described the inefficiency of one of 
                                                 
9 The Mertens group consists of diplomats assisting Coreper I ambassadors, a representative of 
the European Commission, a representative of the General Secretariat of the Council and the 
European External Action Service, and a member of the Council Legal Service. The Group is 
responsible for preparing Coreper I meetings. The meeting usually takes place on Tuesday at 11 
AM, a day before the Wednesday Coreper I meeting. 
10 The Antici Group is similar to the Mertens group and is responsible for preparing Coreper 2 
meetings.  
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his colleagues in the following way: “Nice guy, no doubt talented, but there was not anyone 
who heard what the man said because he always talked in a low voice and without changing the 
tone, and then it was just skewed each time he said something” (Interview 07.01.2015). 
 
The circulation of texts 
 
However, in many ways, the Coreper meeting itself is only the tip of the iceberg – one phase – 
in a continuous and never-ending, networked process of drafting documents. The process of 
text production for an ordinary legislative act starts in the EU’s executive, a Directorate General 
(DG) in the European Commission. It initiates the first draft in consultation with member states 
and stakeholders. All the other Commission DGs can provide their input. Once the Commission 
as a collective institution agrees on a legislative initiative, it sends the text to the Presidency 
(usually a member state) of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.  
 
In the Council, the Presidency puts the text on the agenda of the responsible working group(s). 
The national attachés send the text to their respective governments with a request for 
instructions. The production of instructions is central for any member state. The capital does not 
just send instructions to the representative, as a document representing the government position, 
but instructions are a collective achievement. They may go through many iterations and the 
diplomats “receiving” instructions from home draft them just as much as the ministry “sending” 
the instruction. At times, the instruction can include input from several ministries, the 
government as a whole, national parliaments, and the representation in Brussels. Practitioners 
emphasize three main criteria for a good instruction: it needs to be brief, focused and flexible.11 
This is because negotiations are continuous, time is of the essence and Coreper is seen as a 
problem-cruncher. Negotiators define national interests largely in reaction to what is on the 
table and adapt to the developments in the negotiations. 
 
With the instructions in hand, the attachés in Brussels attend working group meetings during 
which they develop a compromise text in drafting exercises. After each round of negotiations, 
the Presidency circulates the text so that the delegations “can identify which of [their] 
amendments [the Presidency is] taking on board” (Coreper 1). The negotiation in the working 
groups often last for several months, until the Presidency decides that the political pressure has 
to increase, and sets the text on the agenda of the Coreper ambassadors’ meeting. The Antici 
and Mertens prepare the meetings, and prior to the Coreper meeting, the Presidency circulates 
so-called “flashes” that provide details of the particular dossiers. They include status of work in 
working groups, and what the presidency wants Coreper to consider, which could be anything 
from a long and complicated document to 2-3 selected problems. If Coreper succeeds in its 
quest to establish a balanced text, the Council of Ministers adopts the text in a silent procedure. 
Armed with their mandates (which went through more or less careful deliberations in domestic 
bureaucracies) the national Ministers discuss the remaining agenda items. 
 
In the European Parliament, a similar search for compromise text moves from within the 
individual political parties to the respective Committee chaired by the rapporteur. Next, the 
plenary holds a vote. The rapporteur of the European Parliament, the Presidency of the Council 
and a Commission representative then meet in trialogues to identify a compromise text between 
the three institutions. 
                                                 
11 Interviews, 10.04.2018, 18.04.2018, see also Nielsen 2015. 
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Apart from the formal preparation, there is all the informal work, representing the bulk of the 
activity. Much of this takes place over phone and email between permanent representations, 
Commissions, and the Presidency. This involves circulating drafts of documents and segments 
of texts. In addition, capitals are very involved in the drafting process, how exactly depends on 
how each member state coordinates its EU policy domestically.  
 
Literature on the EU’s Council of Ministers and Coreper 
 
Until recently there was limited literature on negotiation dynamics in the Council of Ministers, 
where ministers, officials and diplomats represent and defend member state interests in long 
and sometimes tiresome negotiations. However, with the recent publication of new data, there 
has been a boom in studies of decision-making in the diplomatic “engine room” of the EU 
(Naurin and Wallace 2008, 3-4). Most of the new data available is about voting, which is only 
revelatory to a certain extent. Despite qualitative majority voting (QMV) and enlargement, 
member states take around 80 percent of all decisions by consensus (Häge 2013), but what does 
that mean in practice? 
 
Lack of access remains a major obstacle to research. Thus, most studies depend on secondary 
sources such as interviews and official documents. Apart from interviews, many scholars rely 
on written documents, but only those that are publically available such as Council conclusions. 
The conclusions, the final outcome of the meetings, however, do not provide information on the 
negotiation process. 
 
The majority of scholarship on negotiations in the Council draws on theories of bargaining 
based on the assumptions that states seek to maximize utility and follow logics of 
consequences. The purpose of these studies is to examine how member states influence 
decisions, i.e. the degree to which their policy positions are represented in the final outcome 
(Thomson and Hösli 2006; Warntjen 2010; Polack 2006). These quantitative studies analyze 
how many of each of the government’s preferences are reflected in the final outcome, based on 
various measures of these preferences. Scholars bracket elements of the negotiation process 
itself, but assume it to reflect preferences, voting weights, veto power or information access 
(Bailer 2010; Thomson 2008; Hagemann 2008).  
 
A different strand of scholarship, which seeks to reveal the tacit norms of the Council, is more 
relevant for our research aims. In his pioneering work, Lewis has uncovered a “method of 
community” which is a way of negotiating, based on diffuse reciprocity, trust, consensus, and a 
culture of seeking compromises (2000, 261). Diplomats’ socialization to the rules of Coreper 
helps to uphold the communitarian method (Beyers 2010; Lewis 2005). Yet, largely because 
scholars lack access, but also because they make theoretical assumptions about where agency 
and power lies, they bracket the actual negotiation process (for a call for a practice turn in EU 
studies, see Adler-Nissen 2016). 
 
Another category of insights into decision-making in the Council are media reports and blogs 
produced before and after important meetings. In this regard, especially the work of Peter 
Ludlow is important, although he mainly focuses at the level of heads of state and governments 
(the European Council). Over the last 16 years, Ludlow has produced briefing notes on every 
meeting of the European Council as well as pre-summit briefings on the eve of the meeting and 
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evaluations 3-6 weeks after each meeting.12 All notes are based on oral and documentary 
sources which are not available to the public. However, while Ludlow’s reports offer many 
striking insights about politics at the heart of the EU, they build on second-hand sources and 
contain limited information on negotiation dynamics. 
 
3. Participant observation 
 
Author 2 conducted two and half months of participant observation in a member state’s 
permanent representation to the EU in Brussels and at the Council of Ministers of the EU. She 
applied to the permanent representation to work there as an intern with the purpose to conduct 
research for her PhD dissertation, which centered on negotiation processes. During the entire 
time of the internship she took field notes on her laptop, during some meetings while the 
meeting was progressing, at other times shortly after the meeting had taken place. She shared 
her office with the personal assistant to the Coreper 1 ambassador. At times, her research came 
close to shadowing the Coreper 1 ambassador. She always had direct access to his agenda.  
 
The goal of the participant observation was to get as broad an understanding as possible of the 
everyday operations and quotidian representations of the EU, and how these operations shape 
the European order. The approach was very open and highly inductive. She sought to maintain 
as receptive a mind as possible and pay attention to whatever appeared surprising and 
interesting. At times, she noticed particular developments, but later dropped those strands, 
because they did not appear to lead anywhere. For example, once the Coreper 1 ambassador 
organized an informal dinner at his home for a few Coreper ambassadors, and he wanted to use 
the embassy’s silver cutlery, which the embassy’s cook refused to borrow him, even against a 
signature. The controversy lasted for two weeks and perhaps it raised interesting questions 
surrounding authority in an embassy, but no further incidents allowed to develop this strand of 
thought. 
 
The scholar engaged in participant observation has to mitigate between experience-near 
observation and analytical distance. This can become particularly challenging when having to 
analyze one’s own personal role in a situation in a detached scholarly fashion (Wacquant 2004). 
Specifically, when Author 2 started the participant observation, she was confused as she had to 
deal with incredibly complex technical files on issue areas in which she lacked expertise, while 
at the same time, she had to navigate the highly complex institutional environment in Brussel. 
In order to mitigate this potential personal bias, she observed other people and their embodied 
reactions, and took note of their comments and thoughts in casual conversations. Additionally, 
she had at least weekly conversations with the Coreper 1 ambassador and the Mertens 
(assistant), during which she asked them questions directly linked to the phenomena she was 
observing to acquire clarification and get the practitioners’ own reflections.  
 
Table 1 below indicates which meetings she attended and how many times she participated in 
those meetings. In the overwhelming majority of meetings, she was a passive observer, but in 
rare instances, she participated in the negotiations: First, she replaced an attaché twice at a 
working group meeting of little strategic interest to the member state. Second, she sat at the 
negotiation table at a Council of Ministers meeting during late hours (again in an issue area that 
was of little strategic interest to the member state). Lastly, on the last Coreper 1 meeting of the 
                                                 
12 See Ludlow’s notes here: http://www.eurocomment.eu/peterludlow/ 
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year, she sat at the Coreper 1 negotiation table, because the Coreper 1 ambassador and the 
Mertens had already left for Christmas holidays. In these admittedly rare instances, she had the 
embodied experience of a diplomat involved in the negotiation process. 
 
Beyond the formal meetings listed below, she attended countless informal lunches and couloir 
conversations during which diplomats were interpreting ongoing negotiations, strategizing, 
discussing, and reflecting upon possible scenarios. These instances allowed her to get a peek at 
how diplomats were seeing and experiencing their everyday interactions without directly asking 
them about their opinion. 
 
The overwhelming majority of the documents she analyzed (Table 2) related to the Coreper 1 
agenda, and thus focused on issues of communitarian law, in which qualified majority voting 
(QMV) is the norm, the European Parliament has the right to co-decision, the European Court 
of Justice has jurisdiction, and most of the files are of a very technical nature. Yet, during the 
participant observation she also attended Coreper 2 meetings, and meetings of the Political and 
Security Committee. These committees deal with a high number of agenda items that fall under 
unanimity voting, in which the European Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction, and which 
can often link to high politics. 
 
Interestingly, the Political and Security Committee meets more frequently than Coreper 1 or 
Coreper 2. Yet, the focus in the committee is not as much on drafting text. The committee 
spends most of its time involved in lengthy conversations about the political situation in a 
particular country. It frequently welcomes visitors, such as NATO generals, or UN 
representatives, whom the committee asks informative questions about the on the ground 
situation in a particular country, or about a specific policy issue. Foreign and security 
cooperation is clearly more limited in the EU than cooperation in other issue areas. However, 
when the committee seeks to establish a common position, release a joint press release, or has 
to take a stand on a particular issue, it engages in the same forms of textual editing as Coreper 1 
or Coreper 2.  
 
Apart from participation in numerous Coreper meetings, during her stint in the foreign ministry, 
Author 1 also did a round of participant observation in 2015, attending two Coreper 1 meetings 
and two working group meetings, which have also informed the manuscript. The focus of this 
participant observation was on the choreography of Coreper meetings and the performance of 
instructions. 
 
4. Interviews 
 
In addition to participant observations, the manuscript relies on in-depth interviews. As 
mentioned, the Coreper is a closed body of negotiations and only a limited number of people 
have access to the meeting room. Due to our professional employment and experiences, 
however, we have been able to use our network and goodwill to gain access to both junior and 
very senior diplomats at various stages of the research process. The majority of the interviews 
we have conducted took place as face-to-face interviews. Yet, because of difficulties in 
arranging meetings with people from different member states, we conducted a few of the 
interviews over telephone. Interviews lasted between 15 minutes and one hour and 30 minutes. 
While Author 1 recorded most interviews after agreement with the interviewee, Author 2 
decided not to record interviews and took notes immediately after the interview ended. 
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One of the challenges of doing interviews to uncover everyday practices is to avoid too much 
rationalization by interviewees. As Pouliot puts it, quoting Bourdieu, “as soon as he [sic] 
reflects on his practice, adopting a quasi-theoretical posture [the agent] loses any chance of 
expressing the truth of this practice and especially the truth of the practical relation of the 
practice (Pouliot 2013, 51). We handled this challenge by focusing on concrete examples and 
largely steered away from self-analysis and meta-reflections. 
 
Fundamentally, however, interviews are not a neutral technique, but an interaction between 
scholar and informant, which of course conventions and context constrain. Here, it is important 
to note that all informants were somehow of our professional networks and thus felt at ease with 
the authors. In this sense, we as scholars, were “exploiting this intimacy as an investigation 
tool” (Amit 2003, 3). 
 
Author 1 conducted almost 150 interviews with officials and diplomats in the period 2005-2010 
and in 2015. In 2015, she and her graduate students focused specifically on the choreography 
and performance of instructions at Coreper meetings. The 2015 interviews are quoted directly 
in the manuscript while the other interviews function as background knowledge. 
 
Author 2 conducted 47 interviews across permanent representations, the European Parliament 
and the European Commission (Table 3). Although she initially developed a template to 
conduct semi-structured interviews, she very quickly stopped following the template, because 
she adapted the interview questions in every interview to the job position of her interlocutor and 
to what she had observed during participant observation. 
 
Based on the comments to our submitted manuscript from the editors and the reviewers, 
encouraging us to provide more context and cast more light on the routines and patterns 
involved in the negotiations, we decided to conduct a second round of interviews to further 
investigate the role of ICT in negotiations. Author 1 conducted these interviews and they were 
semi-structured with specific questions in mind, and thus more scholar-steered than the 
previous rounds of interviews. Author 1 interviewed six diplomats: two former Coreper 
ambassadors and two current Coreper ambassadors, one Head of Department (and former 
Antici) and one senior diplomat in the Council Secretariat (Table 4). The interview guide is in 
Table 5. 
 
5. Analytical process 
 
Together, our participant observations, interviews and document analysis reveal that collective 
text drafting is the single most important activity (in terms of time consumption and focus) that 
diplomats and policy makers in the EU are involved in. Coreper has text drafting and disputes 
over textual edits as its primary modus operandi.  
 
We identified the different elements that led to our theoretical conceptualization of track-
change diplomacy inductively from the material listed above in the following ways: 
 
First, we identified the visualization of the documents through first-hand experience. Author 1 
first experienced the importance of visualization when she received the track-changed 
documents in her email box during her employment in the ministry of foreign affairs and when 
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her colleagues discussed them. Subsequently, we have analysed the individual documents. 
Instead of directing our attention exclusively to the content of those documents by undertaking 
discourse analysis, a primary focus was on the ways in which different elements in the 
documents have been visualized. Moreover, participant observation demonstrated that 
diplomats, because of the sheer overload of documents they receive, skim through those 
documents quickly, and visual markers allow them to pay attention to the particularly 
contentious issues in a given text.  
  
Second, we observed the shareability, the large number of authors involved in editing a single 
text during our employment and participant observation and subsequent interviews confirmed 
it. Relatedly, the loss of authorship initially transpired through diplomats’ casual comments in 
conversations with each other, and became very obvious in an informal meeting between the 
Council Legal Service and embassies’ legal advisers. From then on, Author 2 explicitly asked 
diplomats and policy makers about authorship and how it worked. Most of her interviewees 
readily brought up examples of situations in which they had experienced “loss of authorship” 
themselves.  
 
Third, the immediacy and speed of the negotiations was one of the most striking phenomena 
both authors noticed during participant observation and in their daily work. The speed was 
striking because of the observed speed at which the documents circulated, the sheer number of 
documents that circulated, the observed stress levels and haste of the diplomats, the quick 
glances at a few hundred pages of text, and the speed in the negotiation room. 
 
Fourth, how the text helps produces national interests became most clear to us when we saw 
how instructions and mandates are actually formulated. Moreover, we both observed it during 
Coreper negotiations, when we saw how representatives develop their position in response to 
the text and in relation to the other textual propositions at the negotiation table. It became 
further apparent when diplomats discussed negotiations in private conversations with their 
colleagues, and when they talked to us about the negotiations in interviews. 
 
Fifth, the reaching of compromises through textual edits became most apparent when observing 
the negotiations, but it also transpired from reading the background documents. 
 
Lastly, we observed the power of language and drafting skills during negotiations, when it 
became apparent that unless a representative comes up with a suitable textual edit, others will 
not hear her position. We also observed during negotiations the different strategies individual 
representatives used to make themselves heard. 
 
6. Ethics 
 
Confidentiality is a particular issue regarding the material gathered and analysed for this 
manuscript. Some of the material is classified or governments and individual officials regard it 
as potentially sensitive. In addition, national, EU or international law protects some of the 
information (whether in written or oral form). Both during interviews and participant 
observation, confidentiality of the shared knowledge and material is respected. In particular, we 
took great care not to violate trust and confidentiality when dealing with specifically sensitive 
issues such as information about national positions, numbers, personal views, collegial relations 
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and more intimate relations and beliefs. In some cases, we have been allowed to share country 
and individual names. 
 
Our concern with confidentiality explains why we have had to limit direct references to 
countries and people. A lot has been written about the advantages and drawbacks in relation to 
anonymous interviews (Seal, Bloom and Somlai 2000; Volker 2004). Apart from the fact that 
anonymity was often a prerequisite for many of our informants, we must weigh the benefits of 
revealing names against the potential costs to the participants. Such costs could be journalists 
misconstruing research findings, or representatives from other member states using the list of 
names for strategic or political purposes. Moreover, our interviewees’ own colleagues might 
read the text, recognize them and see that they have a more unorthodox position than what they 
usually express. For these and more reasons, we have hidden the names in the manuscript (for 
an elaboration of the pros and cons of anonymity in interviewing diplomats, see Adler-Nissen 
2014, 212-213). 
 
Table 1 Meetings attended during Author 2’s two and a half months of participant 
observation in the permanent representation of a member state and at the Council of 
Ministers  
Type of meeting attended by Author 2 Number 
of 
meetings 
Informal meeting between the Council Legal Service and legal advisers at 
embassies  
1 
Working group meeting (attachés discussing particular issues before they go on 
the Coreper agenda) 
4 
Mertens meeting (preparation for Coreper 1) 8 
Briefing between attaché and Coreper 1 representative 10 
Coreper 1 15 
Coreper 2 5 
Political and Security Committee 3 
Governmental Committee for EU affairs (weekly video conference at which the 
vice-ministers or their representatives are present, as well as Coreper 1 and 2 
ambassadors) 
8 
Briefing between a Minister and the Coreper 1 ambassador; attachés and 
Mertens are also present  
5 
Council of Ministers (primarily attended in the overflow room, where the 
meeting is video streamed) –only attended technical Council formations (such 
as Environment, Energy, Transport, Research, Youth, Culture, and Sport, 
Agriculture and Fisheries, Competitiveness, and Employment, Social policy, 
Health and Consumer Affairs) 
10 
 
Table 2: Internal documents read and tied to the two and a half months of participant 
observation 
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Type of document Explanation Number 
of 
documents 
Bulletin Update of what has happened in EU institutions over 
the past week, i.e. which pieces of legislation have 
been adopted, which topics have been discussed, etc. 
 
1 
Presidency non-paper Discusses a particular topic/issue/piece of legislation, 
its progress and what still needs to be achieved. 
 
4 
Official notes from the 
Governmental 
Committee for EU 
Affairs 
 
Notes taken by a government official, which describe 
the topics that have been discussed, and the positions 
adopted at the Governmental Committee for EU 
Affairs. 
1 
Program of a minister’s 
visit for a council 
meeting 
 
Detailed schedule of a minister’s visit. 1 
Presidency flash Statement that describes the Presidency’s plans and 
expectations for the next Coreper meeting. 
 
6 
Agenda for a Coreper 1 
meeting 
Detailed agenda of the items to be discussed at a 
specific Coreper 1 meeting. 
 
7 
Provisional agenda for 
a Council meeting 
Detailed agenda of the items expected to be discussed 
at a specific Council meeting. 
 
11 
Official notes from a 
Mertens meeting 
Notes taken by the assistant to the Coreper 1 
representative describing what has been discussed at 
the Mertens meeting. 
 
6 
Comments on the 
Coreper 1 agenda 
Responsible attachés describe the issue and 
negotiating positions of member states surrounding 
the individual items on the Coreper agenda. 
 
6 
Notes from the Coreper 
1 meeting 
Notes of the responsible attachés describing the 
Coreper 1 meeting. 
 
6 
Draft Council 
Conclusions 
Presidency consolidated draft council conclusions, 
including highlighted edits. 
 
16 
Draft Council 
Decisions 
Presidency consolidated draft council decisions, 
including highlighted edits. 
 
5 
Presidency policy 
debate 
Background document for a debate to be held on a 
particular policy issue. 
 
5 
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Instructions for a 
working group meeting  
Instructions describing a member state’s negotiation 
position at the working group level. 
 
5 
Instructions for a 
Coreper 1 meeting 
Instructions describing a member state’s negotiation 
position for a Coreper 1 meeting. 
 
99 
Instructions for a 
Coreper 2 meeting 
Instructions describing a member state’s negotiation 
position for a Coreper 2 meeting. 
 
1 
Background document 
from the ministry of 
foreign affairs 
 
Background document for informative purposes for a 
working group meeting. 
 
1 
Draft common 
declaration on a 
particular policy issue 
by a set number of 
member states 
 
Several member states with a similar position can 
draft a common declaration if they cannot obtain a 
sufficient majority in the Council to have a Council 
position.  
1 
Proposal for a directive Proposal for a directive including suggested textual 
edits. 
 
22 
Proposal for a 
regulation 
Proposal for a regulation including suggested textual 
edits. 
 
30 
Proposal for a road 
map 
Proposal for a road map including suggested textual 
edits. 
 
1 
Member state comment 
on a directive proposal 
Individual member states can attach comments to 
directives if they think that some of their key views 
were not picked up in the document. 
 
2 
Member state comment 
on a Council decision 
Individual member states can attach comments to 
Council decisions if they think that some of their key 
views were not picked up in the document.  
 
1 
Exchange of views Informative background document for an exchange 
of views to be held at a Council meeting. 
 
2 
Member state’s 
proposed amendments 
to a directive proposal 
 
Individual member states can circulate their proposed 
edits to a directive proposal. 
6 
Mandate for the 
delegation of a member 
state at a Council 
meeting 
 
Government approved mandate for the delegation of 
a member state at a Council meeting. 
9 
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Urgent message from 
the Presidency 
concerning Mertens 
meeting 
 
 2 
Presidency background 
information for a 
working group meeting 
 
 4 
Member state notes 
from a working group 
meeting 
 
Notes taken by the responsible attaché describing 
what has been discussed at a working group meeting. 
1 
Commentary by the 
foreign ministry of a 
member state about a 
decision from the 
European Court of 
Justice 
 
Serves the permanent representation for informative 
purposes. 
1 
Presidency note for the 
establishment of a 
working group 
 
 3 
Draft joint report from 
the Commission and 
the Council on a 
particular policy issue 
 
Includes suggested textual edits. 2 
Coordination of a 
common EU position 
on an external policy 
issue—draft proposal 
of the general 
secretariat of the 
Council 
 
Includes suggested textual edits. 1 
Note from the Council 
on the use of 
terminology 
 
 1 
Total  266 
 
Table 3: Interviews conducted by Author 2 
Date Title Institution 
10.10.2014 Expert The German Marshall Fund of the United States 
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15.10.2014 Ambassador Permanent Representation of a member state 
20.10.2014 Ambassador Permanent Representation of a member state 
21.10.2014 Foreign Policy 
Advisor 
European Parliament 
23.10.2014 Ambassador Permanent Representation of a member state 
26.10.2014 Media Advisor European Parliament 
28.10.2014 Policy Advisor European Parliament 
28.10.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
28.10.2014 National Seconded 
Expert 
European Commission 
28.10.2014 Mertens Permanent Representation of a member state 
5.10.2014 Mertens Permanent Representation of a member state 
7.10.2014 Policy Advisor European Parliament 
10.11.2014 National Seconded 
Expert 
European Commission 
13.11.2014 Policy Advisor European Parliament 
13.11.2014 Policy Advisor European Parliament 
13.11.2014 Antici Permanent Representation of a member state 
20.11.2014 Member of the 
European Parliament 
European Parliament 
20.11.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
21.11.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
21.11.2014 Ambassador Permanent Representation of a member state 
28.11.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
28.11.2014 Mertens Permanent Representation of a member state 
03.12.2014 Seconded National 
Expert 
European Commission 
03.12.2014 Policy Advisor European Parliament 
04.12.2014 Policy Advisor European Parliament 
05.12.2014 Policy Advisor European Commission 
05.12.2014 Member of the 
European Parliament 
European Parliament 
05.12.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
10.12.2014 Member of the 
European Parliament 
European Parliament 
10.12.2014 Policy Advisor European Parliament 
11.12.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
11.12.2014 Member of the 
European Parliament 
European Parliament 
11.12.2014 Ambassador Permanent Representation of a member state 
12.12.2014 Expert Egmont Institute 
12.12.2014 Policy Advisor European Parliament 
12.12.2014 Legal Advisor Council Legal Service 
15.12.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
15.12.2014 Mertens Permanent Representation of a member state 
17.12.2014 Seconded National 
Expert 
European External Action Service 
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17.12.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
17.12.2014 Legal Advisor Permanent Representation of a member state 
18.12.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
18.12.2014 Seconded National 
Expert 
European External Action Service 
18.12.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
18.12.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
18.12.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
19.12.2014 Attaché Permanent Representation of a member state 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Interviews conducted by Author 1 
 
 
Date Title Institution 
10.04.2018 Ambassador  Permanent Representation of a member state 
13.04.2018 Former ambassador Permanent Representation of a member state 
15.04.2018 Ambassador Permanent Representation of a member state 
15.04.2018 [Senior position] Secretariat of the Council of Ministers 
18.04.2018 Former ambassador  Permanent Representation of a member state 
18.04.2018 Head of Department 
and former Antici 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a member state 
 
Table 5: Interview guide used by Author 1 
 
§ Introduction, including the purpose of interview, the need for examples, guarantee 
anonymity, informed consent. 
 
Questions specifically for former Coreper ambassadors or interviewees with experience from 
the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. 
 
§ What tools were used during negotiations before email and word processing? 
Telephone? Pen and paper? Something else? Examples? 
 
§ What were the practices / processes / techniques for negotiation before email / the use 
of word processing functions, track changes, etc.?  
 
§ How did you find compromises on specific texts? Were there other techniques for 
compromising on texts? Which ones?    
 
§ How was the pace of negotiations compared to today? How did you keep overview?  
 
Questions for everyone: 
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§ Do you always negotiate on the basis of text? Or do you sometimes use other forms of 
visualization? For example, charts, graphs, tables with numbers, etc.?  
 
§ What is your personal experience using track changes to emphasize, bold, strike, 
tables, etc. during negotiations? Do these tools convey negotiation dynamics? How?  
 
§ Do negotiation dynamics develop differently when you have different tools at your 
disposal during negotiations? 
 
§ What is the main effect of email and word processing on the work in Coreper? 
 
§ What are your typical routines, habits and patterns related to handling the track-
changes? 
 
§ How often do you respond to emails from other Coreper colleagues or from the 
capital? Can you expect someone to respond to an email at 2 am on a Sunday?  
 
§ How important are the different text changes? How do you keep an overview over the 
various amendments?  
 
§ Can everyone make as many track-changes as they want?  
 
§ In your experience, who has the greatest influence in the design of the texts? Why? 
 
§ How do you use text messages? What role do text messages play in negotiations?  
 
§ Bonus question: Article 50 (Brexit). Who has negotiated it? 
 
§ Other examples? 
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